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Where money belonging to a client is collected for him by an attorney, and deposited in good faith in a bank of good standing, in the name of the attorney, such
attorney is responsible for the loss thereof through failure of the bank, although the
money was not mingled with his own funds, and although the transmission of the
money collected was prevented by garnishee process soon after its deposit in bank,
and before an opportunity had been presented to send it to the client.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
MITCHELL, J.-Naltner, on the 24th day of February, 1883,
commenced proceedings in attachment against Dolan, and on the
same day caused a summons in garnishment to be served on the
appellants herein. On the 7th day of March following, upon his
intervening petition, Montague was admitted as a party to the proceeding. He filed a cross-complaint, in which he alleged, in substance, that the fund in the hands of the appellants-that being
the subject of the attachment and garnishee proceedings-had been
assigned to him by Dolan, for a valuable consideration, before the
proceedings were commenced. He prayed judgment for the recovery
of the money. The appellants, with the general denial, answered
specially, admitting the possession of the fund which they averred
had come to their hands as the attorneys of Dolan. They alleged
that they had been notified by Montague of his claim after the proceedings in garnishment had becit commenced, and averred their
readiness to pay the money to whomsoever the court should adjudge
entitled thereto. Other answers were filed, to which demurrers
were sustained. The facts were found specially by the court, and
are presented in the following summary:
Dolan, who at the time the suit was commenced lived in Illinois,
owed Naltner $600 then due. The appellants, as attorneys, had in
their hands for collection a claim in favor of Dolan against the
Indiana, Bloomington & Western Railway Company, which Dolan,
on the 13th day of September 1882, transferred, for value, to MonVOL. XXXV.-4
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tague. On February 24th 1883, the day on which the attachment
suit was commenced, appellants received from the clerk of the
United States District Court for the district of Indiana, checks for
something over $80,000, which was in the payment of claims
against the Indiana, Bloomington & Western Railway Company;
which payment was made to them in behalf of Dolan and many
other of their clients. Dolan's claim against the company was
$600. Upon receiving the check they deposited it with the Indiana
Banking Company, which was then in good standing, the deposit
being to the credit of themselves, in their firm name. The money
thus received belonged to some hundreds of their clients, and the
computation of interest, and the dividend to each of his share,
required several days of continuous work before distribution could
be made. The appellants were lawyers-partners-actively engaged
in practice. They had an account at the bank in question, in which
all money collected for and belonging to their various clients was
deposited and checked out in the firm name; but such moneys were
not mingled with their own.
Before they had time or opportunity to pay out .the money in
controversy, the appellants were garnished at the suit of Naltner
They received notice of the assignment to Montague February 28th
1883, four days after the suit was commenced. Montague, within
a few months after giving notice of his claim, and while the proceedings in garnishment were pending, made demand on the garnishee defendant for the money remaining in their hands which was
derived from the Dolan claim. On the 9th day of August 1883,
the Indiana Banking Company, having until that time continued
in good standing and credit, failed. A receiver was appointed for
the bank August 13th 1883. The appellants brought the certificate
of the receiver of the bank for the money in dispute into court,
and offered to surrender it to the person entitled, as the court
should direct. The amount remaining in their hands, in the manner above stated, was $445.69. Conclusions of law were stated
favorably to a recovery by Montague against the appellants of the
amount thus remaining in their hands.
Do the facts found warrant the conclusions of law stated.? Money
belonging to a client, having been received by the attorneys in payment of a claim left with them for collection, the transmission of
such moneylhaving been arrested by garnishee process before an
opportunity for transmitting it occurred, the question is, having
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acted in the utmost good faith, and without any suggestion of fault
or neglect, are the attorneys responsible for the continued solvency
of the bank in which such funds were deposited in their own name,
but not mingled with their own funds, notwithstanding the bank
was in good credit when the deposit was made? The receipt of
money by an attorney, under the circumstances disclosed in this
case, does not pro facto create the technical relation of debtor and
creditor between the attorney and client. It is because it does not
that a suit cannot be maintained by the latter against the former
without first making a.demand. Money so collected belongs to the
client. The attorney occupies toward it the relation of a trustee,
so long as he chooses to treat and preserve the fund as a trust fund.
The circumstances underwhich he will be liable for its loss are precisely those which govern in the case of any other trustee. While
it is preserved in its trust character, if he, exercising the same caution in respect to depositing it, if a deposit becomes necessary or
proper, as a prudent man would in regard to his own money, and a
loss happens, he will be excused: Norwood v. Harness, 98 Ind.
134; McIntosh v. Greensdale, 6 N. E. Rep. 926. The authorities,
however, distinguish between cases in which the deposit was made
in such a manner as to preserve its trust character on the books of
the bank in which the fund was deposited, and those in which the
owner of the fund might be put to the trouble of proving, by extraneous evidence, that the fund was not the individual money of the
trustee. Whenever a trustee, unless properly authorized to do so,
puts the fund in such a shape as to invest himself with a legal title
to it, the cestui que trust has his election either to treat the fund,
according to the appearance of things, as the property of the
trustee, and regard the latter as his debtor, or he may demand
that the title be transferred to him. If a deposit is made -in such
manner as, on the face of the books of the bank in which the deposit
is made, to authorize the trustee, his assignee or legal representative,
to claim it as the fund of the depositor, the cestui que trust has
the option to do likewise: Merket v. Smith, 33 Kans. 66; s. c.
5 Pac. Rep. 394; McAllister v. Commonwealth, 30 Penn. St. 536 ;
l1orris v. Wallace, 3 Id. 319; Jackson v. Bank, 10 Id. 61;
School Dist. v. First Nat. Bank, 102 Mass. 174; Utica Ins. Co. v.
Lynch, 11 Paige 520; Bartlett v. Hamilton, 46 Me. 435; 2 Pom.
Eq. Jur., § 1076; Perry on Trusts, § 443; Story on Agency,

§ 208.
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In case it becomes the duty of an agent or trustee to deposit
money belonging to his principal, he can escape the risk only by
making the deposit in his principal's name, or by so distinguishing
it on the books of the bank as to indicate, in some way, that it is
the principal's money. If he deposit in his own name, he will not,
in case of loss, be permitted to throw such loss on his principal:
Williams v. Williams, 55 Wis. 300; s. c. 12 N. W. Rep. 465 ; and
13 N. W. Rep. 274; Norris v. -Hero, 22 La. Ann. 605; Mason v.
Whitthorne, 2 Cold. 242; Jenkins v. Walter, 8 Gill & J. 218 ;
Robinson v. Ward, 2 Car. & P. 60; .ffacdonnell v. Barding, 7 Sim.
178;
eJlntosh v. G-reensdale, supra. In such a case the good
faith or intention of the trustee is in no way involved. Having,
for his personal convenience, or from whatever motive, deposited the
money in his own name, thereby vesting himself with a legal title,
it follows, as a necessary consequence, when loss occurs, he will not
be permitted to say as against his cestui que trust, that the fact is
not as he voluntarily made it appear.
What the legal or equitable rights of the real owner of the fund
would be in such a case, as against the bank, or as against attaching
creditors of the depositor, has been the subject of much discussion,
and of some diversity of opinion: Pennell v. Deffell, 4 DeG., M.
& G. 372; Farmers' Bank v. King, 57 Penn. St. 202; School
Dist. v. .First lat. Bank, 102 Mass. 174; Jackson v. Bank,
supra; Bundy v. Town of Monticello, 84 Ind. 131, and cases
cited; leLfcain v. Wallace, 103 Ind. 562; s. c. 5 N. E. Rep. 911 ;
JcG
comas v. Long, 85 Ind. 549; -Ellicottv. Barnes, 31 Kan. 170,
173; s. c. 1 Bac. Rep. 767.
Whatever diversity of opinion may be found in respect to the
rights of the bank, or other creditors of the depositor, the authorities agree that a trustee who either invests or deposits trust money
in his own name, without in some way designating it as trust property,
will be responsible for any loss that may occur to the fund while so
invested or deposited. Gilbert v. Welsch, 75 Ind. 557; 2 Lead.
Cas. Eq. 1805. Having put the owner of the fund to the hazard
of losing it, or of maintaining its trust character by such proof
aliunde as may be available to him, the trustee thereby gives the
former the privilege of treating the latter as his debtor, or of supplying the proof, or accepting his admission of the facts, at his
option.
Applying the principles stated to the facts found, the conclusion
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follows that the appellants assumed the risk that the bank in which
the fund was deposited in their name, and from which it could only
have been drawn by their check, would be able to respond with the
money when their check for it should be presented. The fact that
none but money belonging to clients was deposited to the account
in which the fund in question was placed does not alter the case.
The controlling consideration is that it was deposited to the credit
of the firm, without anything to designate or preserve its trust
character. They took and retained the legal title to the deposit in
themselves. In the event of a controversy, the character of the
fund would have depended wholly on extraneous proof. This being
so the owner had the right to elect to stand upon the title to the
deposit as he found it. Having so elected, there is no rule of law
which authorizes any inquiry into the motives for so taking title,
short of an express or implied direction from the ownef of the fund.
The judgment is affirmed with costs.
The first case on the question whether
his favor as receiver, that bill so eara trustee who has deposited the money marked would be specific assets to the
of the cestui que trust in a bank which credit of the trust property." So, in
subsequently fails, is personally liable this case, he held the "receiver charged
therefor, was Kdght v. Lord Plimouth, with a loss by the failure of the banker;
3 Atkyns 480; s. c. I Dickens 120, de- having made the remittance to his own
cided by Lord Ch. HAItDWIOKE in 1747.
credit and use, and not to a specific acIt was there held that "where a receiver count for the trust." The same rule
pays money to a tradesman, and takes was followed by Lord Ch. BROUGHAt,
bills for the sum, if he was in credit at in Salway v. Salway, 2 Russ. & Myl.
the time, though he fails soon after, it 215, subsequently affirmed by the House
shall not affect the receiver." It does of Lords, in 2 Russ. & Myl. 757. See
White v. Baugh, 3 C. & F. 44. In
not appear from the report of this case
Williams v. Williams, 55 Wis. 300, CAswhether the deposit was made individuSODY, J., said : " It is true that Knight
ally, or as receiver.
In Wren v. Kirton, 11 Ves. Jr. 377, v. Lord Plimoth. has frequently been
Lord Ch. ELDO said: "In Knight v. referred to in other cases without much
Lord Plysauth, I apprehend the deposit discrimination: Rowth v. Howell, 3 Ves.
with the country banker was to the ac- Jr. 566; Lovll v. Minot, 20 Pick. 119;
count of the receiver, as receiver ; not to United States v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 343;
his individual account;" and subse- Seawell v. Greenway, 22 Tex. 697 ; but
quently, in the same case, he says: "I the distinction thus made by Lords
should not much fear to contradict the ELnoN and BaOUGHAM seems to be well
case of Knight v. Lord .Piniouth, upon supported by authority." See Massey
what has been done by later authorities, v. Banner, 4 Madd. 413; Tebvs v. Carif it is as represented, for nothing is penter, 1 3,add. 290 ; Mathews v. Brise,
6 Beav. 239. In Massay v. Banner, I
more dangerous * * * * * if he goes
to a responsible banker, and gets a bill Jacob & W. 248, Lord ELDor said: "If
upon a responsible house in London in an assignee pays money into his bank-
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er's hands as money belonging to the
estate, and the banker fails, tile
assignee
is undoubtedly clear from tile
loss ; but
it instead of distinguishing it, he pays it
all into his own account, then it is his
account there ; there is nothing like a
declaration of trust, and it is familiar to
consider him as having it in the banker's
hands for himself, making him liable for
it, &c.:" Pennell v. Du~fell, 4 DeG., M.
& G. 386, 392; School Dist. v. lirst
Vat. Bank, 102 Mass. 174; Mason v.
W1hitthorne, 2 Cold. 242.
In Robinson v. Ward, 2 C. & P. 60,
ABBOTT, C. J. (Lord TENTERDEN),
said: "The defendant should have paid
the money into a banker's hands by
opening a new account in his own name
'for the credit of Robinson's estate, and
so earmarked the money as belonging to
that estate; then it would have been
kept separate." See also Macdaonnell v.
Harding, 7 Sim. 178; Hammon v. Cottle,
6 S. & R. 290 ; Cartwell v. ;Allard, 7
Bush 482 ; Bartlett v. Hamilton, 46
Ale. 435.

In Commonweath v. McAllister, 28
Penn. St. 480; s. c. 30 Id. 536, PoRTEr, J., said, "If he (the trustee)
undertakes to make a deposit in a banking institution, the entry must go down
on the books of the institution, that they
are the funds of the specific trust to which
they belong. He cannot so enter them
as to have them his own to day, if they
are good, and to-morrow, if bad, ascribe
them to the estate, or shift them in an
emergency from one estate to another;
or by the deposit, secure the discount of
his own note, and have the deposit
snatched at by the bank, if the note be
not paid, or attached by a creditor, as
the depositor's individual property. No
matter what lie
inteuds to do, or what
the cashier or clerk may think he is doing,
the deposit must wear the impress of the
trust, or he cannot, when brought to account, call it trust property."
See
Baskins v. Baskins, 4 Lans. 90. Tn
Jenkins v. Walter, 8 Gill & J. 218,

" where a guardian had received a sum
of money belonging to his ward, and on
the day of its receipt, bad deposited it in
a banking institution, then in good
credit, but which subsequently failed,
and taken a certificate therefor, payable
to himself or order, it was held that the
loss resulting from the failure of the bank
should fall upon him, though on the day
of the deposit, by endorsement on the
certificate, lie
declared it to be the property of. his ward and placed in bank for
his benefit :" State v. Greensdule, 6 N.
E. Rep. (Ind.) 926 ; Slanter v. 'avorite,

4 Id. 880; Norwood v. Harness, 98 Ind.
134 ; Marquess v. .a Baw, 82 Id. 550 ;
Snders v. State, 49 Id. 228. But see
Parsley's Adn'r. v. Martin, 77 Va.
In Sargeant v. Dowoey, 5 N. B. Rep.
903 'Wis.), TAYLOR, J., said : "When
the agent deposits in his own name
the money of his principal in a bank,
without an express or implied authority
from the principal to do so, such deposit is a conversion of the money to
the use of the agent as much as if he
loaned the same to hiqneighbor and took
his note for it. The deposit is a loan to
the bank and the depositor becomes the
creditor of the bank for the amount of
his deposit. When, therefore, the agent
deposits money of his principal to his own
credit in a bank, or loans it to an individual, unless it be done with the consent
of his principal, the agent takes all the
risk which attends such depositor loan."2
Story on Agency, sect. 20S.

In .iorris

v. htero, 22 La. Ann. 605, it was held
that" an agent who, when it becomes his
duty to deposit in bank the money of his
principal, fails to make the deposit in
the name of his principal, becomes personally liable for the amount. In such
case the agent will not be permitted to
urge the failure of the bank after the
deposit was made and throw the loss on
the principal :" Webster v. Pierce, 35
Ill.
159 ; Mason v. 11ldtthorne, 2 Caldwell (Tenn.) 242 ;

Ves. 496.

alTrey v. Darby, 6
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The test is not so much the keeping of
a separate decount at the bank, as it is
the parting with, and hence losing, of,
the identity of the trust fund, and having
in place thereof no obligation, contract,

or account which is impressed with the
equitable ownership of the trust: Williams
v. Williams, 55 Wis. 300.
C tRLES BuonKE ELLIOTT.
Minneapolis, Minn.

Supreme Court of 0/do.
ARCHIBALD WOODS v. PAULINE V. WADDLE.
A. and P. were married in West Virginia at their domicile, where A. retained
his domicile. P. went to Tennessee, and in ex parte proceedings there obtained a
divorce &vincalo from A., but as there was no personal service upon A. her application for alimony was dismissed without prejudicc, and to enable her to sue for it
elsewhere. P. then brought suit in Ohio for alimony alone, and to reach certain
property in Ohio belonging to A. In this case she obtained service upon A., who
also appeared and filed pleadings in the case. On the trial the court found sufficient
cause and allowed her alimony. Held, P. had a right thus to bring her action for
alimony alone, and she could have her claim therefor determined, and, if sustained
upon trial, the court could allow her reasonable alimony out of the property of A.
ERROR to the

District Court of Belmont county.

Cowan J' Chambers and J P. Kelly, for plaintiff in error.
L. Danford, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOLLETT, J.-It is not claimed that Pauline V. Waddle was not
rightly divorced and restored to her maiden name; neither is it
claimed that her right to alimony had ever been passed upon in any
prior action.
It is not questioned that the amount of the alimony decreed is
just and reasonable.
If she had not been divorced she was the wife of the plaintiff in
error; and, if residing in Belmont county, without doubt as a wife,
under Section 5702 of the Revised Statutes, she could file her
petition for alimony alone. Section 5702 provides * * * "the
wife may file her petition for alimony alone, or, if a petition for
divorce has been filed by the husband, she may file her cross-petition for alimony, with or without a prayer for the dissolution of the
marriage contract ;" and "habitual drunkenness" is specified as a
cause for alimony.
The old English doctrine, "that alimony has no independent
existence," is not the law of Ohio.
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As to where and by whom a petition for alimony alone may be filed,
section 5690 of Revised Statutes provides as follows: "the plaintiff,
except in an action for alimony alone, shall have been a resident of
the state at least one year before filing the petition ; all actions for
divorce, or for alimony, shall be brought in the county where the
plaintiff has a bona fide residence at the time of filing the petition,
or in the county where the cause of action arose; and the court
shall hear and determine the same, whether the marriage took place,
or the cause of divorce occurred, within or without the state."
No question is made by the record as to her alleged bona fide
residence in Belmont county, as is required by law. The record
shows legal service, and the personal presence of the parties in court.
The language of the statute is;"the court shall hear and determine the same, whether the marriage took place, or the cause of
divorce" (or, as here alimony) "occurred, within or without the
state." And the court found the plaintiff in error "guilty of
habitual drunkenness as alleged in the petition." This is the
"cause" for alimony. Thus the language of the statute answers
nearly all the questions presented in this case.
It is not claimed that this woman's right to alimony had been
passed upon by any court; and the Tennessee court not having
jurisdiction of this matter, did not pass upon it, and it could not
adjudge alimony in that case. 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 170; Whart.
Ev. 818.

So far as appears, the action in Belmont county was the first in
which the defendant in error could recover alimony from the plaintiff in error, and no limitation is claimed. But the words of the
statute (§ 5702 Rev. Stat.) are "the wife may file her petition
for alimony alone." May the word "wife" as used in this statute
include a woman divorced, as was this defendant in error ?
In the case of Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, this court applied
the benefits of this statute to a woman whose husband had been
divorced from her by a court in Indiana, while she remained domiciled in Ohio. In, that case, on page 512, WITE, J., said: "It
is not essential to the allowance of alimony, that the marriage
relation should subsist up to the time it is allowed. On appeal,
alimony may be decreed by the District Court, notwithstanding the
subsisting divorce pronounced by the Court of Common Pleas. It
is true the statute speaks of the allowance as being made to the wife.
But the term ' wife' may be regarded as used to designate the per-
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son, and not the actual existing relation ; or the petitioner may still
be regarded as holding the relation of wife for the purpose of
enforcing her claim to alimony."
He thus shows that the word "wife" designates the person
divorced, after the divorce is granted. He further considers the
questions at length, and the court there held, "that the decree of
divorce was no defence to her petition for alimony."
The principles there stated and held, sustain this judgment.
Here there is no showing of fraud on the part of the defendants
in error, nor any claim that the plaintiff in error has been wronged
by having the alimony suit tried in a separate action.
We think that under the law of this state, the District Court, in
allowing alimony to the defendant in error, did not err, and the
judgment is affirmed.
There are two vital questions involved
in this case--one the chancery doctrine
of alimony recognised and followed in
most all the states, and the other, the
statutory alimony as advanced in Ohio.
Alimony is a provision for the support
or maintenance of the wife, grantable by
a court, and payable by the husband :
Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill 207 ; Wallingqford
v. W llingsford, 6 Har. & J. 485 ; Rogers v. ines, 6 Ired. 293; and it is temporary or permanent. Temporary when
granted pendente lite, or as a separate
maintenance ; permanent when allowed
as a permanent provision for support upon a divorce a vinculo. The former is
separate maintenanee.
In England, during the Cromwellian
period, there were no ecclesiastical courts.
Before that period and after it, until
1858, the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction of divorce and alimony,
but only allowed alimony as incident to
divorce: Oxenden v. Oxenden, 2 Vern.
493; Head v. Head, 3 Atk. 295 ; Lasbrook v. Tgler, I Ch. Rep. 44 ; Ashton
v. Aston, Id. 164 ; Nicholls v. Danvers, 2 Vern. 671 ; Shelford M. & D.
598.
The reason for this was that from the
earliest period, alimony was administered as an incident to a separation and
VOL. XXXV.-5

as an original right, and secondly, it
had no existence at common law or in
chancery, as an independent right, but
was recognised as an incident to a proceeding for some other purpose, such as
a supplicavit: Head v. Head, 3 Atk.
547 ; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. 191.
Lord LoUGHBOROUG31 said in Ball v.
Montgomnery, that he did not recollect
any cases in Vernon which allowed alimony without a separation, and stated
that a married woman could not be a
plaintiff in a suit in equity for a separate
maintenance, and no court had original
jurisdiction to award it. This was followed in Stones v. Cooke, 7 Sim. 22 ;
Vandergucht v. DeBlaquiere, 8 Id. 3115.
The reasoning advanced was that cohabitation is the essential of marriage
imposed by law and public policy, and
to have a separate support she must
have a separate existence. Hence, in
England, equity only decreed a separate
maintenance as an incident to some other
jurisdictional matter, such as a supplicavit, and the ecclesiastical courts decreed
it as an incident to divorce.
In this country, the courts of Alabama,
California, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsvlvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and
Ohio, have decreed alimony alone. The
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other states follow the English doctrine
of the states whose courts grant alimony
alone. Some base the right on statute
and some on chancery jurisdiction.
In Maryland, the Court of Chancery,
as early as the year 1707, asserted the
jurisdiction to grant alimony, independent of divorce : McNamara's Case,
2 Bland. Ch. 566 n., followed by Saythecomb's Case, in 1738, and Scott's Case,

in 1746, and Gavane's Case, in 1750
(all reported in 2 Black. 566). This
jurisdiction was, in 1777, confirmed by
statute, giving the Court of Chancery
full power to hear and determine all
causes for alimony. In Jamison v. Jamison, 4 Md. Ch. 289, the court said,
" this court had jurisdiction before the
revolution, to grant alimony, independent
of the application for divorce :" Helmes
v. Franciscus, 2 Bland. Ch. 555 ; Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J.
485 ; Hardingv. Harding, 22 Md. 337 ;
Keerl v. Keerl, 34 Id. 21 ; JT.G. v. H.
G., 33 Id. 401 ; Schindel v. Sehindel,
12 Id. 294; Dunnock v. Dunnocd, 3 Md.
Chan. 140: Crane v. Megznnis, I Gill
& J. 463. A scrutinyof these cases does
not show the granting of alimony after a
divorce a vinculo, except in the case of
Crane v. .3feginnis.
In Worth Carolina, the chancery courts
assumed jurisdiction, as early as 1796, to
grant alimony independent of divorce:
Spiller v. Spiller, I Hayw. 482 ; Knight
v. Knight, 2 Id. 101 ; on the- ground
that chancery had that inherent jurisdiction ; but whether or not it is established that alimony is grantable after a
divorce is not very clear: Schunwald v.
Schonwald, Phil. Eq. 215 ; Hodges v.
Hodges, 82 N. C. 122.
This inherent jurisdiction of chancery
to grant alimony independent of divorce,
has been adopted in Virginia; Purcell
v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & Munf. 507; Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. 662 ; following Duncan v. Duncan, 19 Ves. 394,
and rejecting [lead v. Hend. 3 Atk. 295,
and Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr.

195 ; but as Duncan v. Da-ican, is a
case of separate maintenance, no Virginia case can be found holding that alimony will be granted after a divorce in
an independent suit.
In Alabama, the court in Glover v.
Glover, 16 Ala. 442, reviewed the English eases, and rejected the English doctrine, and held that it would grant alimony in a proper case, because the husband
is bound to support his wife. In this
state, as in the other states, the courts
use general language which seems to
cover alimony proper, yet the courts do
not distinguish between alimony and
separate maintenance: Wray v. Wray,
33 Ala. 187 ; Turner v. Turner, 44 Id.

437. In the latter case the court allowed alimony after a divorce &vinculo.
But as that case was one where the wife
sued for divorce and alimony in the jurisdiction of her domicile and of the delictum,
to which the husband pleaded an ex partec
divorce procured in a foreign jurisdiction, and the court held that the ex parte
divorce did interfere with the wife's
right to alimony, or any other pecuniary
right in Alabama. The court did not
assert any reason for this ruling, and
yet acknowledged the validity of the ex
parte divorce. If the ex parte divorce
was valid, then the ground for allowing
alimony is based upon the inherent
power of equity, or upon a statute. But

as there is no statute, and the prior cases
did not assert the inherent equity jurisdiction, the true ground upon which this
decision can be placed, is, that an ex parte
divorce, not obtained, at the domicile,
nor at the place of the delictnm, cannot
affect the interests of the other party.
In this case the domicile was Alabama,
and the husband deserted the wife in
Alabama ; hence Alabama was the domicile and the place of deliclum. This accords with Shannon v. Shanmon, 4 Allen
134; Smith v. Smith, 13 Gray 209;
Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 30 ; BTrafnan
v. Hoffmnan, 46 N. Y. 30; Presser v.
Warner, 47 Vt. 667.
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In California, the court, in Gallandv.
Galland, 38 Cal. 265, after a careful review of the cases, divided upon the
question, the majority of the court sustamining the jurisdiction to grant alimony
independent of the question of divorce,
and the minority rejecting it. The majority opinion approved and followed
the Kentucky courts.
The Kentucky courts very early assumed jurisdiction to decree separate
maintenance : Lockridge v. Lockridge, 3
Dana 28; Boggess v. Boggess, 4 Id.
307 ; Wooldridge v. Lucas, 7 B. Mon.
49 ; and in Butler v. Butler, 4 Litt.
205, after reviewing the English cases,
the court rejected the English doctrine,
hut in the reasoning of the court no reference is made to the grounds upon
-which the English doctrine is based,
namely, that no court had original jurisdiction of alimony alone, but had it as
incidental to other subjects of jurisdiction. Yet, in Rogers v. Rogers, 15 B.
Mon. 364, the court held that alimony
could be allowed after a divorce il vinculo. The court did not review the adjudications, nor place its opinion upon
any process of reasoning, yet that doetrine was announced and seems to be
the rule in that state: Hulett v. Hulett,
80 Ky. 364.
In Mississippi, the courts have held
both sides of this question. In Shotwell
v. Shotwell, I Sm. & 3K. Ch. 51, the
court held "that a separate suit may be
maintained for alimony after a decree
for a divorce," * * * but this ruling
was reversed by the Court of Errors and
Appeals, in Lawson v. Shotwell, 27
Miss. 630, holding "the authorities,
almost without exception, agree that allmony is allowed only as an incident to
some other proceedings which may he
legally instituted by the wife against the
husband, such, for instance, as an action
for the restitution of conjugal rights, divorce, St." This was followed and
affirmed in Bankston v. Bankston, 27
Miss. 692.
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In Pennsylvania, alimony is grantable
after a divorce: MeKarracher v. McKarracher,3 Yeates 56.
In South Carolina, the courts have
granted separate maintenance, but termed
it alimony, and there is no case where
alimony was decreed after a divorce d
vinculo: Jelineau v. Jelineau, 2 Dess. 45;
Prather v. Prther,4 Id. 33 ; Threewits
v. Threewits, 4 Id. 560 ; Princev.Prince,
1 Rich. Eq. 282.
In Tennessee, the court in Richardson
v. Wilson, 8 Yerg. 67, granted alimony
after a legislative divorce, having a reservation as to alimony; although the court
held that alimony would have been
granted if the legislative enactment had
not contained this reservation. The court
did not review the authorities, nor is it a
well-considered case.
Excepting Ohio, this is the state of the
decisions holding, or which seem to hold,
that alimony can be granted in an independent proceeding ; and is not an incident to a divorce, but the weight of authority takes the other view.
In Arkansas, the court, in Bowman v.
Worthington, 24 Ark. 529, held that allmony is incident to a divorce, and there
is no jurisdiction to entertain a separate
application for it. The Georgia courts
hold the same doctrine: McGee v. McGee, 10 Ga. 477 ; Goss v. Goss, 29 Id.
109. In Indiana, the doctrine was very
clearly announced in Fischli v. Fischli, I
Blackf. 360, stating that "alimony is
incidental to divorce, the court which
decrees the divorce is to make the pro*
* we
vision, and if that court fails *
*
*
*
for
any
no
authority
know of
other court to remedy the evil or extend
the provision," there being no precedent,
except a few extreme cases for any other
view, the weight of authority being the
other way, hence (in this case) the Kentucky court having had full jurisdiction
to decree the necessary maintenance and
alimony, as incident to the divorce, that
matter cannot now be retried because
"when a matter is adjudicated by a
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court of competent jurisdiction it is for- Mix v. Mix, I Id. 108; Perry v. Perry,
ever at rest, not only what was actually 2 Paige 501 ; Hnffman v. Hoffnan, 46
determined, but every other matter which N. Y. 30 ; and in Vermont. Harrington
the parties might have litigated in the
v. Harrington, 10 Vt. 505 ; Posser v.
cause," and the matter to be litigated in
Warner, 47 Vt. 667.
divorce proceedings is "the separate
The decisions in Ohio on this subject
maintenance (alimony), the wife's con- are not of much value. In Cooper v.
dition in life, the fortune she brought in
Cooper, 7 Ohio St. 238, HITCHCOCK,
J., held that a foreign ex parte divorce
marriage, and her husband's circumstances." In Atuckenburg v. Haller, 29
was valid in Ohio, hence a subsequent
Ind. 139, the court stated that "alimony
application for alimony could not be susis an incident of a suit for divorce, and
tained, and in Mansfield v. Xelntyre, 10
is not a matter which can constitute the Ohio 30, the same judge held that a forsubject of an independent suit." Fol- eign ex parte divorce was not valid in
lowed in Moon v. Baum, 58 Ind. 194;
Ohio and was not a bar to an application
Middleworth v. McDowell, 49 Id. 386.
for dower. In Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St.
The Illinois courts have followed the 502, the court granted alimony after an
same doctrine : Chestnut v. Chestnut, 77 ex parte Indiana divorce.
The court
I1. 346; but in Iowa the courts have based its opinion partlyon the Ohio statbeen on both sides, the cases Blgthe v.
ute, but most confidently on Mansfidd
Blythe, 25 Iowa 266, Harshberger v. v. MclntyJre; Richardson T. Wlson, 8
H arshberger, 26 Id. 503, Cole v. Cole, Yerg. 57 ; Crane v. Meginnis, I Gill &
23 Id. 433, McEwen v. McEwen, 26 Id.
J. 463 ; and Shotweil v. Shotwell, I Sm.
375, holding that no independent action & M. Ch. 51. The case is not sustained
for alimony can be maintained, and the by the statutes nor the decisions cited.
case Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310 (14
Indeed the case is worthless, being withAm. R. 525), holding that an independ- out precedent, statute, authority and
ent action can be maintained.
sound reasoning. The ease of RichardThe doctrine that alimony is incident
son v. Wilson, granted alimony after an
to a divorce has been adopted in Maine : ex parte legislative divorce because of
Jnes v. Jones, 18 Ale. 311 ; Henderson the statute of 1799, ch. 19,
10, which
v. Henderson, 64 Id. 419 ; Littlefield v. act is contained in sections 2468 and
Paul, 69 Id. 533; and in Massachusetts
2469 of the present Tennessee statute.
Shannon v. Shannon, 2 Gray 287 ; Bald- That act empowered a court to grant
win v. Baldwin, 6 Id. 342; Coffin v.
alimony at any time after the parties had
Dunham, 8 Cush. 405 ; and in Michigan,
been divorced, besides, the legislative
Peltier v. Peltier, Har. Ch. 19 ; Perkins divorce reserved the right to alimony,
v. Perkins, 16 Mich. 167; Wright v.
and besides, the divorce was obtained and
W~right, 24 Id. 180; and in Missouri,
the application for alimony made in the
Dogle v. Doyle, 26 Mo.545 ; Simpson v. forum of the domicile and delictum. It
is not authority for Cox v. Cox, because
Simpson, 31 Id. 24; and in New Hampshire, Parsonsv. Parsons, 9 N. H. 317 ; it is based upon an express statute, upon
Sheafe v. Sheafe, 24 Id. 569; and in the reservation in the divorce, and upon
New Jersey, Kirrigan v. Kirriqan, 2 the jurisdictional forum. In Cox v. Cox,
McCart. 146 ; Nichols v. Nichols, 10 the facts were that the husband and wife
C. E. Green 60 ; Yule v. Yale, 2 Stock. were domiciled in Ohio. The husband
138 ; Rockwell v.Morgan, 2 Beas. 119 ; deserted this wife, went to Indiana and
and in New York, Atwater v. Atwater, procured an ex parte divorce. The wife
53 Barb. 621 ; Codd v. Codd, 2 Johns.
still domiciled in Ohio, and at the place
Ch. 141 ; Lewis v. Lewis, 3 Id. 519 ; where he had deserted her, applied for
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divorce and alimony on the'ground of desertion. The husband pleaded the Indiana divorce as a bar. The Common
Pleas court decreed divorce and alimony.
The District Court refused to try the
question of alimony de novo. The statute
provides for such trial. For this refusal
the Supreme Court reversed the District
Court, holding that "the wife's domicile
remained unaffected by the husband's
desertion."
And that "the Indiana
divorce was no defence,"-because Ohio
was the domicile, the place of the ddlctum, and divorce was obtained on false
grounds.
In truth, the decision should be placed
on the ground that the ex parte divorce
was a fraud upon the rights of the wife,
and not recognisable in Ohio, and upon
this ground will find precedent in Shannon v. Shannon, 4 Allen 134 ; Hoffman
v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Prosser v.
Warner, 47 Vt. 667; Smith v. Smith, 13
Gray 209 ; Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20;
Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272: and in
the learned article of Judge REDFIELD,
in 3 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 193. It
is not authority for the doctrine that alimony is grantable after a divorce a viaauo. The point decided was, that the
District Court erred in not trying the
question of alimony de ,oro, as provided
by the statute.
The case of Crane v. Meginnis is not
authority for Cox v. Cox, because the
Maryland court was governed by an express statute enacted in 1777, and incorporated in Rev. Stat., art. 51, 17, and
by the prior decisions that the Maryland

courts had inherent original jurisdiction.
Nor is the case of Shotwell v. Shotwell
authority, because that was overruled in
Lawson v. Shotwell, 29 Miss. 630 ; followed in Bankston v. Bankston, 27 Miss.
629.
This case of Cox v. Cox, is not sustained by the statute. The statute provides for three kinds of alimony. pendente lite in 5701, separate maintenance
in
5702, and permanent upon the
granting of a divorce a vinculo in sects.
5699, 5700. Sect. 5702 provides for
a separate maintenance and not for alimony after a divorce, because (1), the
statute speaks of the petition as the wife's
petition against her husband: (2) in
such cases the statute provides for the
husband to file a cross petition for divorce;
and (3) the statute, in sect. 5703 provides
that in such cases the judgment shall
(a) provide for the children; (b) give
the wife a separate maintenance, (c) restore to her her property : and (d) grant
her the rights and powers of afem esole,
" free from the control or interference of
her husband."
In fact, this statute is
based upon and taken from the old doctrine of divorce a ,aensa et thoro, and can
only be understood with reference to that
doctrine.
The principal case being
founded on Cox v. Cox, and the foregoing
statute-a misconstruction of it-is of no
value and indeed worthless as an authority, precedent, or an exposition of
juridical reasoning.
JoHN F.. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.

supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BUSH v. BREINIG.
A contract made by a person so destitute of reason as not to know the consequences
of his contract, though his incompetency be produced by intoxication, is voidable, and
may be avoided by himself, though the intoxication was voluntary, and not procured
by the circumvention of the other party.
A. made a bid at a public sale of a piece of real estate, and shortly thereafter
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signed a contract, and paid earnest money on account. It was proved, that at the
time the contract was signed, he was so intoxicated that lie did not know what he
was doing. He afterwards brought suit to recover his earnest money. Held, that
his intoxication made the contract voidable, and that he was entitled to recover.
ERROR to Common Pleas Lehigh county.

Assumpsit by James H. Breinig against William H. Bush.
William H. Bush, the owner of a hotel property in Quakertown,
advertised it for public sale. James H. Breinig bought the property at the sale for $13,400, his bid being the highest. Shortly
after the time of sale, the agreement of sale was executed, Breinig
paying $495 down in cash. Before and during the continuance of
the sale, up to the time the agreement was executed, Breinig was
drinking excessively, and by reason thereof became intoxicated to
such degree that, at the time the agreement was executed, he did
not know what he was doing, and was bereft of the use of his
reason and understanding. Breinig afterwards brought this action
to recover back the $495. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff, and judgment being entered thereon, defendant took this writ.
Barry C. Stiles and John D. Stiles, for plaintiff in error.
Marcus C. L. Kline, for defendant in error.
J.-When the plaintiff's bid was accepted, the bargain was struck, and there was an oral agreement for the sale and
purchase of land on the terms stated in the conditions of sale. That
agreement was not void, but voidable. Neither party could have
compelled specific performance. Either would have a right of action
for damages resulting from non-performance by the other; but the
vendor could not tender a deed and recover the purchase-money, for
that would be enforcing specific performance. He could only
recover the actual loss. Upon the signing of the conditions, prima
facie there was a contract that could be specifically enforced.
Money paid on either the oral or written contract could not be
recovered unless there was cause for rescission. Here it is conceded that there was an oral contract ; but the plaintiff denies that
he made a written contract, and paid money and note thereon,
because at the time his signatures and money were given, he was
incapable of making a contract by reason of drunkenness. If he
was without reason and understanding, the payment of the money
ought not to be treated as voluntary, nor his signature as creating
a new obligation. The conditions of sale may have been read in
TRUNKEY,
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his hearing at the auction, and he may have understood them when
he bid; but he paid no money until the time of signing the alleged
contract, and if he was then bereft of reason, he may avoid the
apparent obligation made while in that condition. It is not a question whether what he did was the carrying out of a fair and reasonable oral contract, or whether the property was worth the sum bid;
it is a question of his capacity to make a contract at the time he
signed the conditions and paid the money. The subject of the contract was not necessary fdr himself or family. He took nothing.
into his possession, and therefore had nothing to restore in the act
of rescission ; and he brought suit so promptly that at the trial the
question of delay in rescinding was not raised.
The rule formerly was that intoxication was no excuse, and
created no privilege or plea in avoidance of a contract; but it is
now settled according to the dictate of good sense and common
justice, that a contract made by a person so destitute of reason as
not to know the consequences of his contract, though his incompetency be produced by intoxication, is voidable, and may be avoided
by himself, though the intoxication was voluntary, and not procured
by the circumvention of the other party: 2 Kent Comm. 451. A
drunkard when in a complete state of intoxication, so as not to
know what he is doing, has no capacity to contract in general ; but
his contract is voidable only, and not void, and may therefore, be
ratified by him when he becomes sober : Benj. Sales, par. 33.
The learned judge of the Common Pleas instructed the jury, that
the plaintiff could recover only on- the ground that the contract did
not bind him, because he was intoxicated to a degree that he did not
know what he was doing at the time he affixed his seal and gave
the money; that, if he was in such a state of drunkenness as not
to know what he was doing, he cannot be compelled to perform the
contract; and that if, at the time of signing the contract, he was
able to comprehend the nature and effect thereof, the alleged
intoxication is no defence. All that accords with principles so well
settled as to be found in approved text-books. They apply to a
case like this; not where an intoxicated man gave his negotiable
paper which had passed to an innocent holder for value, as was the
case in State Bank v. MeoCoy, 69 Penn St. 204.
In answer to the defendant's first point, the court charged that
the drunkenness of the plaintiff, to relieve him from the contract,
must have been such that he did not know what he was doing; it
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must have been such as to suspend the use of reason and understanding. There is no error in that. True, the word "utterly" is
omitted, which is used in the defining of the state of drunkenness
in Story, Eq. Jur. par. 231 ; but the sense is not materially different; and that word is omitted by many in the attempt to define the
degree of intoxication, and absence of reason. The point was well
answered; its single affirmance might have misled thejury. " Unf ir advantage" was not a question submitted.
The fifth assignment is not sustained. Although the question
ought not to have been allowed when put, for the reason stated in
the objection, very soon there was testimony that the witness was
intoxicated at the time referred to in the question. No objection
was made to its form, and its admission out of order was harmless.
None of the remaining assignments require special remark.
Judgment affirmed.
That a contract entered into when the
obligor is in a state of intoxication, so as
to deprive him of the exercise of his reason, is voidable, and not void, and hence
is capable of ratification by him, and
that the intoxicated party may, for that
cause, avoid it, although the intoxication
was voluntary and not procured through
the circumvention of the other party, may
be considered as well settled : Barrett v.
Burton, 2 Aiken 167 ; Natthews v. Baxter, L. R., 8 Exch. 132 ; Broadwater v.
Darne, 10 Mo. 277; Eaton v. Perry, 29
Id. 96 ; Miller v. Finley. 26 Mich. 254;
flansjfield v. Watson, 2 Iowa 111.
Being voidable only, such a contract
cannot be impeached by third persons, so
long as the party who was intoxicated
acquiesces : Eaton v. Perry, 29 Mo. 96 ;
although it may be by his legal representatives: Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1
Hen. & Muuf. 70.
A contract voidable by reason of the
intoxication of one of the parties, may
be rescinded by him within a reasonable
time after becoming sufficiently sober to
know the character of his contract:
Cummings v. Henry, 10 Ind. 109.
The rule as to what will constitute a
ratification is substantially the same as
in the case of infancy, that any distinct,

unequivocal act, after becoming sufficiently sober to comprehend the nature of
the transaction, manifesting an intention
to be bound by the contract and inconsistent with its disaffirmance, will amount
to a ratification: Mansfiedd v. Watson,
2 Iowa 111; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. &
W. 626.
The rule in equity as to this class of
contracts is well stated by Sir WILLIAx
GRANT, in Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves.
Jr. 12, as follows: "I think a court of
equity ought not to give its assistance to
a person who has obtained an agreement
or deed from another in a state of intoxication; and, on the other hand, ought
not to assist a person to get rid of any
agreement or deed merely upon the
ground of his having been intoxicated at
the time: Dunnage v. White, 1 Swanst.
137. I say merely upon that ground; as,
if there was, as Lord HAst wcxCE expresses it in Cory v. Cory, i Yes. 19,
any unfair advantage made of his situation, or, as Sir JOSEPH JEKYLL says, in

Johnson v. ffedlicott, 3 P. Wins. 130,
note a, any contrivance or management
to draw him into drink, he might be a
proper object of relief in a court of
equity. As to that extreme case of intoxication that deprives a man of his

LAKE SHORE & MICH. SOUTHERN RY. v. SPANGLER.
reason, I apprehend that, even at law, it
would invalidate a deed obtained from
him while in that condition." See also,
I Story Eq. Jur., seet. 231, et seq.; 2
Kent Com. 452, note; Mfansfield v.
Watson, 2 Iowa 115 ; Shaw v. Thackray,
1 Sm. & G. 540. Though the general
doctrine of Cooke v. Clayworth seems to
be well settled, especially in its application to a degree of intoxication less than
excessive, there seems to be some difference of opinion as to the true interpretation of the case, as to whether a court of
equity will assist a person to get rid of
an agreement or deed merely upon the
ground of his excessive intoxication,
where there has been no unfair advantage taken of his condition, nor any contrivance or management to draw him
into drink. All of the authorities now
agree that equity will relieve if any unfair advantage has been taken of him,
etc. The following authorities seem to
favor the position that equity will not relieve merely upon the ground of intoxication (no distinction being made as to
the degree thereof), in the absence of
fraud, unfair advantage, etc., but will
leave the party to his remedy at law:
Campbell v. Ketcham, 1 Bibb 406;
White v. Cox, 3 Hayw. 82 ; Rutherford
v. Ruiff, 4 Dessaus. 350 : Jones v. Perkins, 5 B. Mon. 225 ; Johnson v. 11edlicott, 3 P. Wins. 130, note a; Shaw v.
1hauckray, I Sm. & G. 540 ; Pittenqer v.
Pittenger, 3 N. J. Eq. 161 ; Ilatchinson

41

v. Tindall, 3Id. 360 ; Cranev. Conklin,
I Id. 346: 2 KentCom. (12th ed.) 452,
note c; I Fars. Cont. (6th ed.) 384,
note d.
The following authorities, on the other
hand, favor the proposition that, where
the drunkenness is so excessive as to deprive a man of his reason, equity will
relieve: Mansfield v. Watson, 2 Iowa
115 ; Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb 168;
Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hen. & Munf.
70 ; Birdsong v. Birdsong,2 Head. 289;
Belcher v. Belcher, 10 Yerg. 121 ;
RFiench v. French, 8 Ohio 214. See also
the editor's note at the end of Cooke v.
Clayworth, 18 Ves. Jr. (Sumner's ed.)
18 ; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., sects. 231, 233,
and note; Metc. on Cont. 82; Barrett
v. Buxton, 2 Aik. 167 ; Gore v. Gibson,
13 M. & W. 623.
Perhaps the most of the authorities on
this point may be reconciled on the
ground that dealing with a person in a
state of excessive intoxication is prima
facie fraudulent. See Jones v. Perkins,
6 B. Mon. 225. citing 1 Story's Eq. Jur.,
sects. 233, 234.
As to the decision in the principal
case, there can be no question as to its
correctness. The only wonder is that
the correctness of the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas should have
been questioned.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
v. SPANGLER.
The liability of railroad companies for injuries caused to their servants by the
carelessness of other employees, who are placed in authority and control over them,
is founded upon consideration of public policy, and it is not competent for a raiiroad
company to stipulate with its employees at the time, and as part of their contract of
employment, that such liability shall not attach to it.

ERROR to District Court, Lucas county.
Spangler, the defendant in error, was a brakeman on a freight
VoL. XXXV.-6
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train of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company.
While in the line of his duty he was injured, without his fault, and
by reason of the negligence of the conductor of the train. He
brought his action for damages for the injury so received. The
company alleged for defence, among other things, "that at the time
of the hiring of plaintiff by defendant as a brakeman upon her trains
of cars, as in the petition alleged, and as a part of the terms of
said hiring, and in consideration thereof, plaintiff entered into an
agreement and stipulation in writing with" Spangler, which contained the following stipulation: "Second, that while the company
will be responsible to me for the discharge of all its duties and
obligations to me, and for any fault or neglect of its own, or of its
board of directors or general officers, which are the proximate cause
of injury, yet it will not be responsible to me for the consequences
of my own fault or neglect, or that of any other employees of the
company, whether they or either of them are superior to me in
authority, as conductor, foreman, or otherwise, or not." The evi:
dence tended to support this defence. The trial court refused, upon
request of the company, to charge the jury that, "if the jury find
from the testimony that the plaintiff, at the time he was employed
by the defendant as a brakeman, executed and delivered to the
defendant the stipulation, a copy of which is set out in the answer,
and that the same was accepted by the defendant, by and through
its proper officer or agent, then the defendant is not liable for the
alleged negligence of the conductor complained of in the petition ;"
assigning as a reason for the refusal that, in the opinion of the court,

such stipulation was not binding upon the plaintiff below, it being
against public policy. A judgment of recovery by Spangler was
affirmed on error in the District Court. This judgment is now
sought to be reversed for alleged error in affirming the judgment
of the trial court. The refusal of the latter court to charge the
jury as requested is now assigned for error. Upon the question
thus presented to the court rests the disposition of the case.
C.

. Scribner, for the plaintiff in error.

J. B. Seney, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWEN, C. J.-Is it competent for a railway company to stipulate
with its brakemen, at the time and as part of their contract of
employment, that the company shall not be liable for the negligent
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acts of its conductors ? Western, etc., Bd. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465, is
cited, with other decisions of the same court, affirming and following it, in support of the affirmation of this proposition. In that
case it was held that such a contract, so far as it does not waive any
criminal neglect of the company, or its principal officers, is a legal
contract, and binding upon the employee. But McCoy, J., speaking for the court, says: "We do not say that the employer and
employee may make any contract-we simply insist that they stand
on the same footing as other people. No man may contract contrary to law, or contrary to public policy or good morals, and this
is just as true of merchants, lawyers and doctors-of buyers and
sellers, and bailors and bailees-as of employers and employees."
This invites us to inquire whether, and to what extent, the contract we are dealing with is affected by considerations of public
policy. It is maintained on behalf of the company that "a rule
absolving the company from liability to the brakemen for negligence of the conductor may operate to constitute the brakemen a
sort of police; may induce them to be more watchful, and report
to their superiors the delinquencies of the conductor; and, if they
are unwilling to do this, they, and not the company, should suffer
the consequences. A rule of this kind is calculated, also, to better
protect the public against injuries to merchandise in course of
transportation, by promoting greater diligence and watchfulness on
the part of the brakemen employed upon the trains."
Also that
"a stipulation which would place additional responsibility upon the
employee, and require, for his own protection, a close observance of
the rules of the company, and a strict watch upon the couduct of his
immediate superior, would tend to promote the safety of passengers
and merchandise in transit." If this view is tenable, it follows
that public policy is concerned in and subserved by such a-contract
as is here sought to be enforced. As brakeman on the train,
Spangler was subject to the orders and control of the conductor.
In Little Miami Bd. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, it was first held,
though by a divided court, that a railroad company is liable to an
employee for an injury received through the negligence of another
employee, under whose control he is placed.
This principle was again considered in Rd. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St.
202, and was applied by a unanimous court to a case 'like the one
at bar; and the railroad company was held liable to a brakeman
for an injury resulting to him from the carelessness of a conductor,
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under whose control he had been placed by the company. In the
course of an able and exhaustive opinion, RANNEY, J., says: "The
servants employed to execute cannot recover for injuries arising
from a failure in that part of the business committed to them, because it is their failure, and not that of their employer; and
although it should happen from the negligence of but one of them,
yet each one entered the common service with a knowledge that
others must be engaged, and they were jointly bound to perform
what was jointly entrusted to them, and public policy may be concerned in their keeping a supervision over each other for the purpose. But how this can be made to extend to the conductor, over
whose acts they have no supervision or control, and are not presumed to be possessed of the requisite intelligence for the purpose,
we are wholly unable to see; and, equally so, how the safety of
travellers is likely to be jeoparded by adding to the responsibility
of the conductor for his carelessness that of the company that places
him in power. * * * It is the duty of the servants to obey the
orders of the superior thus placed over them, and to perform as he
shall direct. * * * But they cannot be made to bear the losses
arising from carelessness in conducting the train, over which their
employer gave them no power or control, either separately or collectively, until we are prepared to say that justice and public policy require the consequences of duty omitted by one party to be
visited upon the other, although stripped of all power to prevent
such consequences."
A careful examination of this case and of Bd. v. Stevens, supra,
which it approves and follows, will make it apparent that the liability of railroad companies for injuries to their servants, caused
by the carelessness of those who are superior in authority and control over them, is placed chiefly upon consideration of public policy.
The doctrine established by these cases has remained unquestioned
by this court for more than thirty years. It furnishes a conclusive
answer to the contention of the company that the stipulation which
it seeks to enforce-would better protect the public by promoting
greater diligence on the part of brakemen, and the consequent
safety of passengers and merchandise in transit.
We are thus relieved of all discussion of the relation which the
liability of railroad companies for injuries to their servants, caused
by the negligence of their superiors in authority, sustains to the
policy of the state. It is the firmly-established policy of our law
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that such liability should attach. It follows that even Rd. v.
Bishop, 3upra, which is the strongest authority cited by the company in support of its position, fails to support the view contended
for. As we have seen, that case expressly declares that contracts
contravening public policy will not be enforced. The policy of our
law being well settled, it only remains for us to inquire whether
railroad companies may ignore or contravene that policy by private
compact with their employees, stipulating that they shall not be
held to a liability for the negligence of their servants, which public
policy demands should attach to them. The answer is obvious.
Such liability is not created for the protection of the employees
simply, but has its reason and foundation in a public necessity and
policy which should not be asked to yield or surrender to mere
private interests and agreements.
The trial court was right in refusing the instruction requested,
and the judgment is affirmed.
The question as to the extent to which
an employer may limit his liability to his
employee, for negligence in employing
incompetent agents or workmen, or furnishing unsafe or unsuitable machinery,
is one that has been adjudicated, but
rarely in the higher courts.
The facts in Western 4- Atlantic Rd.
v. Bishop, 60 Ga. 465, seem to have
been similar to the facts in the principal
case, and the conclusion reached exactly
contrary. We confess that the reason
ing of the Ohio court, regarding the
Georgia case, appears lame and unsatisfactory. In the case in Georgia, the employer pleaded in defence of the action,
by the injured employee's wife, a contract of which the following is part:
"And it is understood between the
parties, and expressly agreed, that the
said Lucien J. Bishop, in consideration
that the said Western and Atlantic
Railroad Company will hire and pay
him the wages stipulated, will take
upon himself all risks connected with
or incident to his position on the road,
and will, in no case, hold the company
liable for any injury or damage he may
sustain on his person or otherwise, by
what are called accidents or collisions

on the train or road, or which may result
from the negligence, carelessness or misconduct of himself or another employee
or person connected with said road, or
in the service of said company." The
court said, " A common carrier is not
strictly a private person. He undertakes
to deal with the public, and the law considers the rules applicable to him, as
rules affecting the public interest. And
it is upon this ground that the cases go
which, while they recognise the right of
a carrier to limit his liability so far as lie
is an insurer, at the same time deny his
right, even by special contract, to stipulate that he shall not be liable .for negligence of himself or servants. **
*
For these reasons the contract of a common carrier, is an exception to the
general rule I that men must be permitted to make their own agreements,
and that it is no concern of the public,
on what terms an individual chooses to
contract.' None of this reasoning applies to the case before us. This suit is
not against the railroad company as a
carrier. The husband of the plaintiff
was one of the agents by whom the defendant was exercising the employment
of a common carrier. His relation to
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the company was strictly a private one.
His contract of service was a free one.
He did not stand in the situation of a
traveller or shipper of goods, who cannot stop to higgie or refuse to go on or
to ship his goods.
" The railroad company has no monopolyof service. It is only one of amillion
of employers with whom the husband of
plaintiff might have sought employment.
He deliberately, and for a consideration
undertook what he knew to be dangerous
service, and contracted that he would
not hold the company liable for the negligence of its servants, or even for the
negligence of the company, itself. * * *
Nothing in the contract can, therefore
protect the company, when the negligence which has caused the damage,
is a crime, when it comes within that
kind of negligence which is called in
section 4291 of the Code (1873), criminal negligence, recklessness of human
safety and human life. That sort of
negligence is forbidden by law, and punishable by law as penal. It is contrary
to good morals and to public policy, as
declared by law."
So much of the above as excludes
from the consideration of cases like
these, as authorities, all cases passing
upon the right of common carriers to
limit their liability, as common carriers,
seems to us logically conclusive.
In a later case, the Georgia court declared that a contract similar to the
above, would protect the employer from
recovery by an employee, for injuries
sustained from the negligent running of
a train over the road of another company : Galloway v. Western 4- Atlantic
Rd., 57 Ga. 512.
The same court, in discussing the right
of the employee's wife to recover for his
homicide, where he had entered into such
an agreement, declared : "And under
the view we have taken of the rights
of the wife, that she must show a
violation of some duty the company owed
to her husband, we think she is bound

by the relation they had established between themselves by contract not illegal,
that the wrong she sues for must be a
legal wrong, a wrong which the law
recognises as a breach of some ot the
duties the road owed to her husband,
that she stands in hils shoes, has his
rights, and takes his responsibilities :"
W. 6- A. Rd. v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461;
Hendricks v. W. 4- A. Rd., Id. 467.
The doctrine of the above cases seems
to be recognised as the law in England :
Griffith v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q. B. Div.
357; s. c. 26 Alb. L. Jour. 43.
In a nisiprius case in Pennsylvania,
it was said that a clause in the printed
rules of a railroad company, given to the
employee at the time of his employment,
to the effect that "the regular compensation will cover all risk or liability from
any cause whatever in the service of the
company," would protect the company
from an action for injuries received from
the company's negligence: Mitchell v.
Penn. Rd., 1 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.)
717. This case is of little authority,
however, as it appears to have been decided on other grounds.
In 1876, the Georgia legislature
passed an act making any act of commission of negligence, or omission of duty by
any agent or employee of a railroad company,criminal negligence, when resulting
in the serious injury of any person ; and
under this law, contracts like those in
the former Georgia cases are void as
against public policy : Cook v. W. 4- A.
Rd., 72 Ga. 48.
On the other hand, one of the federal courts has declared in favor of the
principal case. In a suit brought by
the administrator of an employee, killed
through the use of defective machinery,
where a contract absolving the employer
from damages arising from negligence
was sought to be used as a defence,
GRESHAM, J., said: "When the defendants' negligence in supplying his
employee with unsafe machinery has
caused the death of the latter, the law
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will not allow the defendant to say as in
effect he does say in his answer: ' It is
true that my machinery was defective
and unsafe and my negligence caused the
death of my employee, but I am not
liable to those who have suffered from
the loss of his life, because I had a contract with my employee, which secured to
me the right to supply him with defective
and unsafe machinery and to be negligent.' Such a contract is void as against
public policy:" 10 Bissell 486; s. c.
8 Fed. Rep. 782 ; s. c. criticized 24
Alb. L. Jour. 383.
Under a statute in Kansas, railroad
companies are liable for injuries received
by an employee, though due to the negligence of a fellow-servant. In defence
of an action of this nature, a railroad
company introduced a contract in substance like those given above. The
court said: "Now if the statute was
enacted for the better protection of the
life and limb of railroad employees, it
would be against public policy for the
courts to sanction contracts made in
advance for the release of this liability,
especially when we consider the unequal
situation of the laborer and his employer.
* * * The state has such an interest in
the lives and limbs of its citizens, that
it has the power to enact statutes for
their protection, and the provisions of
such statutes are not to be evaded or
waived by contracts in contravention
therewith:" Kan. Pac. Ry. v. Pavey,
29 Kas. 169.
In Memphis 6- Charleston Rd. v.
Jones, 2 Head (Tenn.) 517, it was
held that such a contract would not protect the employer from the wilful neeligenco of an engineer, resulting in the

killing of a slave.

We are inclined to believe that the
doctrine declaring contracts of the nature
of those given above, void as against
public policy, is correct.
The employees of corporations, especially, are at great disadvantage in making contracts of this nature, and arguments based on the absolute freedom
and equality of the contracting parties
are simply "fine talk." That such contracts tend to lessen the vigilance of employers, seems but natural, while thin.
they tend to quicken the employee's attention to duty, is, at best, very doubtful. "We do not think it likely that
persons would be careless of their lives,
and persons and property, merely because they might have a right of action to
recover for what damage they might
prove they had sastained. If men are
influenced by such remote considerations
to be careless of what they are likely
to be most careful about, it has never
come under our observation. We think
the policy is clearly on the other side. It
is a matter of universal observation, that
in any extensive business where many
persons are employed, the care and prudence of the employer is the surest guaranty against mismanagement of any
kind. The employer would, we think,
be much more likely to be careless of
the persons of those in his employ, since
his own safety is not endangered by any
accident, when he would understand that
lie was not pecuniarily liable for the careless conduct of his agents:" Little Miami Rd. v. Steven% 20 Ohio 415. See
also, I Cent. L. Jour. 485 ; 2 Thomp.
Neg. 1025.
CHAS. A. ROBBINS.
Lincoln, Neb.
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Decrees in equity operate only on the person ; and suits will be entertained,
although the subject of the suit is situated in another state.
Therefore, if a creditor send, or is threatening to send, his claim into a state in
which the debtor does not reside, and there seek to reach his wages, and by reason
of such proceedings the debtor will be deprived of his right of exemption, the courts
of the state in which the debtor resides will restrain the creditor from proceeding in
the foreign jurisdiction, if he be within the court's jurisdiction.
APPEAL

from the Floyd Circuit Court.

B. P. Davis, for appellant.
J. X ilVarsh, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOT, J.-It
is alleged in the complaint that the appellant is
a resident householder of this state, and an employee of a railroad
company incorporated under the laws of the state; that the appellee
is also a resident of Indiana ; that the latter is about to institute
proceedings in attachment in the state of Illinois, and will, unless
restrained, garnish the wages due the former from his employer;
and that the purpose of the appellee is to prevent the appellant from
availing himself of the exemption laws of Indiana. Prayer for an
injunction restraining the appellee from prosecuting his proceedings
in attachment in the courts of Illinois.
It is a familiar principle of equity jurisprudence that decrees in
equity operate only on the person, and that suits will be entertained,
although the subject of the suit is situated in another state. Mr.
Pomeroy thus states the general principle: "Where the subjectmatter is situated within another state or country, but the parties
are within the jurisdiction of the court, any suit may be maintained
and remedy granted which directly affect and operate upon the person of the defendant, and not upon the subject-matter, although the
subject-matter is referred to in the decree and the defendant is
ordered to do or to 'refrain from certain acts towards it, and it is
thus ultimately but indirectly affected by the relief granted. As
examples of this rule, suits for specific performance of contracts,
for the enforcement of express or implied trusts, for relief on the
ground of fraud, actual or constructive, for the final accounting and
settlement of a partnership, and the like, may be brought in any
state where jurisdiction of defendant's person is obtained, although
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the land or other subject-matter is situated in another state, or even
in a foreign country :" 3 Por. Eq. Jur., § 1318. Judge SXoRY
lays down a like doctrine: Story Eq. Jur., § 899. Our own court
has iecognised and enforced this equitable principle, as, indeed, all
the courts have done, without any material diversity of opinion :
Bethell v. Bethell, 92 Ind. 318. The principle asserted by these
authorities supplies the initial proposition for our decision, and the
only possible doubt that can arise is whether it applies to such a
case as the present.
The authorities do apply it to such cases, and, in our judgment,
they proceed on sound and satisfactory reasoning. In Snook v.
Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516, the question was presented as it is here,
and it was held that an injunction would lie. The same view of
the law was asserted in Dehon v. Foster,4 Allen 545, where it was
said: I- An act which is unlawful and contrary to equity gains no
sanction or validity by the mere manner or form in which it is done.
It is none the less a violation of our laws because it is affected
through the instrumentality of a process which is lawful in a foreign
tribunal. By interposing to prevent it, we do not interfere with
the jurisdiction of courts in other states, or control the operation
of foreign laws. We only assert and enforce our own authority
over persons within our jurisdiction, to prevent them from making
use of means by which they seek to countervail and escape the
operation of our laws, in derogation of the rights and to the wrong
and injury of our own citizens." In the recent case of Cunninghtam v. Butler, 6 N. E. Rep. 782, the general principle which
rules here is strongly asserted and rigidly enforced. The question
came before the court in .Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Geo. 206, in
the same form as it comes before us, and it was held that an injunction would lie. What we here said of the case just mentioned
applies to Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203, where the precise question
was adjudicated. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in two recent
cases, adopts substantially the same views as those asserted in the
cases to which we have referred: Zimmerman v. Franke, 34 Kan.
650 ; Missouri Pacific Rd. v. Maltby, Id. 125.
The object of our exemption laws, as this court has many times
declared, is to secure to a resident householder the reasonable comforts of life for himself and his family. This is a doctrine asserted by
our organic law, and by our statutes. It was to give full and just
effect to this humane and benign principle of our law that the
VoL. XXXV.-7

WILSON v. JOSEPHS.

legislature enacted a statute making it an offence for any person to
send a claim against a debtor out of the state for collection in order
to evade our exemption laws. Rev. Stat. 1881, sect. 2162. The
enactment of which we are speaking is prohibitory in its character;
for it is one of the rudimentary principles of the law that a statute
making an act a criminal offence prohibits its performance as
effectually as if the prohibition were expressed in direct terms.
There can therefore be no doubt that our statutory law prohibits a
creditor from evading our exemption laws by sending his claim to a
foreign jurisdiction for collection. The attempt to take from a
workman the wages earned by him by sending the claim to a jurisdiction where our exemption laws will not avail him, is one that the
courts will riot tolerate. They will, on the other hand, lay "the
strong arm of chancery" upon persons within their jurisdiction, and
prevent them from taking away the wages which our constitution
and our statute wisely secure to him for the support of his family.
The case, Uppinghouse v. Mundel, 103 Ind. 238, s. c. 2 N. E.
Rep. 719, is addressed to questions essentially different from those
presented by this record, and it is, therefore, not at all in point.
Judgment reversed.
English Cases.-The Court of Chancery of England at an early day exercised the power asserted in the principal
case. The case of Penn v. Baltimore, I
Ves. Sen. 444, is an illustration of this
power, where the boundary line between
Maryland and Pennsylvania was settled.
Proceeding on the theory that its decrees operated only in personam, that
court has foreclosed a mortgage in the
island of Sark, Toller v. Carteret, 2
Vern. 494, in the West Indies ; Archer
v. Preston, 1 Eq. Abr. 133; Lord
Kildare v. Bustace, 1 Vern. 419 ; Lord
Arglasse v. 31uschamp, Id. 75, 135;
and in other of England's colonial
possessions: Paget v. Ede, L. R., 18
Eq. 118. (In this country, see Iead v.
New York, 6-c., Bd., 45 Conn. 199;
and 2 Jones' Mort., sect. 1444).
In the case of Portarlingtonv. Soulb~y,
3 Myl. & K. 104, Lord BRoUGasLM reviews at length the cases before the
Court of Chancery on this subject. The
endorsee of a bill of exchange was en-

joined from proceeding in the courts of
Ireland, on the ground that, if he haa
proceeded in the English courts, he
would have been enjoined by the Court
of Chancery, because contrary to good
conscience.
Lord BROUGHlAM said: "Soon after
the restoration, and when this, like every
other branch of the court's jurisdiction,
was, if not in its infancy, at least far
from that maturity whieh it attaine.
under the illustrious series of chancellors
-the
Nottinghams and Macclesfields,
the parents of equity-the point received
a good deal of consideration in a case
which came before Lord CLAnmi"xON,

and which is reported shortly in Freeman's Reports, aol somewhat more fully
in Chancery Cases, under the name of
Lowe v. Baker, 2 Freeman 125 ; s. c. 1
Ch. Cas. 67. In Lowe v. Baker, it appears that only one of several parties
which bad begun proceedings in the
court of Leghorn was resident within the
jurisdiction there, and the court allowed
/
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the subpoena to be served oa him, and
that this should be good service on the
rest. So far, there seems to have been
very little scruple in extending the jurisdiction. Lord CLARENDoN refused the
injunction to restrain these proceedings
at Leghorn, after advising with the other
judges. But the report adds: ' Sed
quare, for all the bar was of another
opinion;' and it is said that, when the
argument against issuing was used, that
this court had no authority to bind a
foreign court, the answer was given that
the injunction was not directed to the
foreign court, but to the party within the
jurisdiction here. A very sound answer,
as it appears to me ; for the same argument might apply to a court within this
country, which no order of this court
ever affects to bind, our orders being
only pointed at the parties, to restrain
them from proceeding. Accordingly,
this case of Lowe v. Baker has not been
recognised or followed in later times.
Two instances are mentioned in Ar.
Hargraves' collection, of the jurisdiction
being recognised ; and in the case of
W~harton v.May, 5 Yes. 271. In Beauchamp v. Marquis of Runtley, Jac. 546,
which underwent so much discussion,
part of the decree was to restrain the defendant from entering up any judgment,
or carrying on any action in what is
called the Court of Great Sessions in
Scotland; meaning, of course, the Court
of Session. I have directed a search to
be made for precedents, in case the jurisdiction had been exercised in any instances which have not been reported ;
and one has been found directly in point.
It is the case of Campbell v. Houlditch,
in 1820, where Lord ELDox ordered an
injunction to restrain the defendant from
further proceeding in an action which he
had commenced before the Court of Sessions in Scotland. From the note which
his lordship himself wrote upon the petition, requiring a further affidavit, and
from his refusing the injunction to the
extent prayed, it is clear that he paid

particular attention to it. This precedent, therefore, is of very high authority.
In truth, nothing can be more unfounded
than the doubts of the jurisdiction. That
is grounded, like all other jurisdictions
of the court, not upon any pretension to
the exercise of judicial and administrative rights abroad, but on the circumstance of the person of the party on
whom this order is made, being within
the power of the court. If the court can
command him to bring home goods from
abroad, or to assign chattel interests, or
to convey real propety locally situated
abroad ; if, for instance, as in Penn v.
Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444, it can
decree the performance of an agreement
touching the boundary of a province in
North America; or, as in Toiler v. Carteret, 2 Yern. 494, can foreclose a mortgage in the Isle of Sark, one of the
Channel Islands, in precisely the like
manner, it can restrain the party being
within the limits of its jurisdiction, from
doing anything abroad, whether the
thing forbidden be a conveyance, or
other act, in pais, as the institution or
prosecution of an action in a foreign
court."1
Thus where a British creditor fraudulently obtained a judgment in the British West Indies, against his debtor, and
sold the debtor's real estate on execution, and became the purchaser under the
decree, the Court of Chancery set aside
the sale for fraud : Croustown v. Johnston, 3 Yes. Jr. 170; s. c. 5 Id. 276.
On a bill to redeem, all the parties being within the jurisdiction of the court,
a decree was entered, requiring an inquiry to be made as to the amount due,
and restrained proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage in a foreign
court: Beckford v. Kemble, 1 Sim. &
Stu. 7.
A creditor had availed himself of a decree in England, to procure relief agaiusD
the assets of an estate, and he was enjoined from proceeding with a suit against
the same estate in an Irish court. Beau-
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champ v. Lord Huntley, Jac. 546. Af- creditor knew, when he instituted the
ter decree, proceedings were begun in a foreign suit, that insolvent proceedings
foreign court, but they were enjoined : were about to be instituted against the
Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4 Ayl. & C. debtor at home. The object of the for585 ; s. c. 2 Bear. 208; see Graham v.
eign suit was to obtain a preference.
Maxwell, I Mac. &G. 71 ; Kennedy v.
The injunction was granted, after an
Earl of Cassillies, 2 Swanst. 313 ; Busby elaborate presentation of the principles
v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297 ; Harrison v.
underlying the case: Dehan v. Foster, 4
Gurney, 2 J. & W. 563; Munbury v. Allen 545 ; Cunningham v. Butler, 6 N.
Bunbury, 3 Jur. 644 ; affirming Carron E. Rep. 782. On a second hearing, the
fron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. 416 ; s. c. resident defendant was allowed his costs
1 Beav. 318 ; Cas. 416; ,Jones v. Ged- in the foreign court up to the time the
ders, 1 Ph. 724; Elliot v. Lord Mltinto,
bill for the injunction was filed; but
Mad. & Gel. 17; Jackson v. Petrie, 10 not after that date: Dehan v. Foster, 7
Yes. 164.
Allen 57. See Lawrence v. Batcheller,
131 Mass. 506.
But where an encumbrance rested upon
In New .York, the courts exercise this
immovable property situated in a foreign
country, and the creditor brought suit in power in extreme cases, and punish a
that country to enforce his rights, the disobedience of their orders as a conCourt of Chancery refused to restrain tempt: Erie Ry. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y.
him, even though the encumbrancer was 637. Generally, the courts will not ina company in the course of winding up;
terfere, but leave the parties to fight out
Moon v. Anglo Italian Bank, 10 Ch. Div. the case in the foreign jurisdiction:
Williams v. Ayrault, 31 Barb. 364 ;
681 see In re Boyse, L. R., 15 Oh. Div.
5 1; Hope v. Carnegie,L. R., I Ch. App.
.51ead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 402 ; Burgess
3-20; In re Chapman, L. R., 15 Eq. 75;
v. Smith, 2 Barb. Ch. 276 ; Bicknell v.
Ostell v. Le Page, 2 DeG., M. & G. Tield, 8 Paige 440.
But where the injunction defendant
892.
was proceeding abroad before an AmeriIrish Courts.-A suit was brought in
can consul, who had no jurisdiction of
the Irish Court of Chancery, and a suit
concerning the same subject-matter was the case, an injunction was granted :
instituted afterwards in the English Court Dainese v. Allen, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
of Chancery ; the plaintiff in the Eng- 212. So, where the defendant, in a
lish suit was enjoined in Ireland from divorce case, commenced an action in
further proceeding in England without Connecticut against his wife for a sepapermission of the Master of Rolls, there ration, and a decree relieving him from
to be obtained, upon notice to the plain- the obligation of supporting her, intendtiff in the Irish Court: Parnell v. Par- ing to bring it to trial in that state before
his wife could obtain a trial in New
nell, 7 Ir. Ch. 322.
York; and all her witnesses resided in
American Cases.-The courts ofAmerica have not been slow to follow the New Jersey, and she was pecuniarily
English practice, upon the same princi- unable to defend the action brought in
ples underlying the decisions of that Connecticut, an injunction was granted
at her request to stay the husband's pro\country.
In Massachusetts, in a case before the cution of his Connecticut case : Kittle
v. Kittle, 8 Daly 72.
Supreme Court, it was sought to restrain
a creditor residing there from proceeding
In the case of Claflin4- Co. v. Hamlin,
62 How. Pr. 284, the plaintiffs were
against a resident creditor of Mlsssachusetts in the courts of Pennsylvania, in burned out in Chicago's great fire, by
garnishment, on the ground that the reason thereof they became indebted
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in the sum of one million dollars, and
settled with their creditors at twenty-five
cents on the dollar. Afterwards one of
their creditors brought an action in Illinois, though a resident of New York, as
were also the debtors then, alleging that
the debtors had secretly settled with some
of their creditors at more than the dividend received by them. It appeared
that the suit was commenced in Illinois
for blackmailing purposes and to ruin
the credit of Claflin & Co. A restraining order was granted. So, where it
appeared that the rights of the parties
could not be litigated fully abroad, the
plaintiffs were restrained : Failv. Knapp,
49 Barb. 299 ; see Hayes v. Ward, 4
Johns. Ch. 123.
The Georgia cae, cited in the principal case, was where a creditor sued his
debtor, both in that state and in New
York, on the same claim ; and first obtained judgment in Georgia, which was
paid off. He fraudulently led the debtor
to believe that the New York case would
not be pressed to judgment, but it was
in fact so done, the Georgia court restrained the creditor from further proceedings in New York. Both parties resided in
Georgia. See also Lightfoot v. Planter's
Bank, 58 Geo. 136. Likewise in the
same state some attorneys brought suit
for their foreign clients in the federal
court, and were enjoined, but disobeyed
the order ; they were fined for contempt ;
Hines 6- Hobbs .v. Rawson, 40 Ga.
356 ; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 581.
In Vermont this power will not be exercised unless there exists some peculiar
equitable ground for so doing, and the
mere preference of the plaintiff to have the
matter determined in his own state courts
is not sufficient. If the court cannot enforce its decree, it will also deny the
writ ; and this is true of all courts. This
would be the case when the injunction
defendant resides abroad, out of the jurisdiction of the court, and has no property
within the state where the application is
made for a writ of sequestration to ope-

rate upon in case a decree be entered :
Brnk v. Rutland, 6-c., Rd., 28 Vt.
470 ; see Vermont, 6-c., Rd. v.Verraont
Central Rd., 46 Id. 792.
In Illinois relief was refused, although
all the parties were before the court, on
the ground that, after suit was commenced
abroad, it would not be controlled by the
Illinois courts: Harris v. Pullman, 84
I1. 20 ; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 416. But
in a case where the plaintiff and defendant were partners, and the defendant
obtained a dissolution of the partnership
in the Wisconsin courts, in which it was
stipulated that the plaintiff might carry
on the partnership business under the
direction of a receiver, with the right to
all the products manufactured in the
business, the court restrained the defendants fron illegally interfering by replevin
suits with the sale of such manufactured
products : Pindell v. Quinn, 7 Ill. App.
605 ; see Great Falls, g-c., v. Morster,
23 N. H. 470.
In 'New Hampshire this power id exercised ; but not where the foreign judgment is merely erroneous, and relief can
be obtained by an appeal: JMetcalf v.
Gilnore, 59 N. H. 417 ; s. c. 47 Am.
Rep. 217. And in Michigan this relief
is denied generally, on the ground that
it would be an undue interference with
the administration of justice in foreign
courts : Carroll v. Farmers' 4- Mechanics' Bank, Harr. 197, citing Allead v.
Merritt, 2 Paige Ch. 402.
In a proper case, a party will be restrained by a state court from proceeding
in a federal court: Hines 6- Hobbs v.
.Rawson, supra; and the federal courts
will also restrain a party from proceeding
in a state court, on a proper case made :
see, however, Rogers v. Cincinnati, 5
McL. 337 ; Town oJ Venice v. Woodruff,
62 N. Y. 462.
Like the principal ease, proceedings
abroad to attach earnings of a laborer
that are exempt at home from executiq,
is a common device of the creditor. The
case of Dehonv. Foster, 4 Allen 545, was

